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dling motions made pursuant to Section 668. It was well settled in New York,
as stated in People v. Proesser,6 that the defendant's failure to take any affirmative steps toward securing a speedy trial would not constitute a waiver of
his rights under Section 668, but any affirmative act of the defendant, which
showed his intention not to insist on a speedy trial, would constitute a waiver
of his right to dismissal for failure to prosecute. The fact situation in People
v. Godwin,7 was similar to the case under discussion. The defendant spent 21
months in jail after he was indicted before he was brought to trial. The defendant then delayed the trial for 2 additional months after the 21 month delay,
by requesting adjournments. The Court of Appeals in a unanimous decision,
held that this constituted a waiver of the defendant's right to a dismissal of
the indictment.
The decision in the present case, s appears to over-rule the Godwin decision. 9 This change however, appears to be one toward a more just and realistic
approach to dealing with motions made pursuant to Section 668. The purpose
of this section is to protect accused persons from prolonged imprisonment;
relieve them of the anxiety and public suspicion which accompany indictment;
and to help insure justice by holding trials when evidence is fresh, and the
memory of witnesses strong.' 0 Once the trial has been delayed, the damage
has been done. At this point the defendant is entitled to a dismissal. It is
unjust that the defendant will waive his rights by requesting necessary adjournments. Now the defendant can request an adjournment, in order to insure
himself of the best possible defense, without having to waive any rights which
may have previously accrued to him under Section 668.
VALIDLY SENTENCED DEFENDANT CANNOT BE RESENTENCED

In May of 1957, defendant Alvich was indicted for first degree sodomy
and second degree assault. Alvich pleaded guilty to the assault charge and
in June of 1957 he was sentenced, under Section 2189-a of the New York
Penal Law," to indefinite probation and required to undergo psychiatric
treatment during the probationary period.' 2 There was no disposition of the
sodomy charge.
6. 309 NK.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
7. 2 N.Y.2d 891, 161 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957).
8. Supra note 5.
9. Supra note 7.
10. Supra note 6.
11. N.Y. Penal Law § 2189(a):
Indeterminate sentences of one day to life. No person convicted of a crime
punishable in the discretion of the court with imprisonment for an indeterminate
term, having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life, shall
be sentenced until a psychiatrist examination shall have been made of him and a
complete written report thereof shall have been submitted to the court. Such
examination shall be made in the manner prescribed by sections [659, 660, 661, &
662(e)] of the code of criminal procedure. Such report shall include all facts and
findings necessary to assist the court in imposing sentence.
12. N.Y. Penal Law § 243 provides that if a person commits the crime of assault
in the second degree with intent to commit sodomy in the first degree he may be sentenced
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In August of 1958, Alvich was arraigned for parole violation and the
prosecutor made a motion to have the prior judgment and sentence of June
1957 set aside. On December 22, 1958 the prior judgment and sentence were
set aside on the ground that the requirement of Section 2189-a requiring
psychiatric examination before sentencing was not fulfilled. Defendant was
subsequently sentenced to imprisonment for two to four years.
Defendant was unsuccessful in challenging the imposition of the new
sentence before the Appellate Division, 13 but the Court of Appeals, in the case
of People v. Alvil,1 4 held that since the judgment and sentence of June 1957
were validly imposed they could not be treated as void.
In holding for the defendant, the Court of Appeals had to determine what
was required by way of psychiatric examination by Section 2189-a because, if
it was not complied with, the judgment and sentence would have been invalidly
rendered and the new sentence would stand.
The record disclosed that on two occasions in 1957, while defendant was
awaiting arraignment, he was examined by a county appointed psychiatrist
to determine whether or not he was capable of understanding the charges
against him. The psychiatrist's report was made available to the District Attorney and to the court who used them in determining the sentence to be imposed. The Court also relied on the report of a psychiatrist engaged by the
defendant.
Because the court below relied on the reports of at least two psychiatrists
the Court of Appeals held that Section 2189-a was substantially complied with
and that technical compliance wasn't necessary so long as the Court received
the required information to sentence the defendant. 15
Since a judgment validly rendered cannot be treated as void and set aside
arbitrarily, it seems that the prosecutor should have proceeded under Section 935 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 6 since once he proved a parole
violation, the court would have the power to impose any sentence it could have
imposed when the sentence of indefinite probation was imposed.
The question of waiver of the requirements of Section 2189-a was brought
up on appeal. The defendant claimed that Section 2189-a was enacted primarily
for the benefit of those sentenced pursuant to it and that since it was his
to an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of one day and a maximum of which shall
be the duration of his natural life.
13. People v. Alvich, 8 A.D.2d 956, 190 N.Y.S.2d 772 (2d Dep't 1959).
14. 7 N.Y.2d 125, 196 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959).
15. N.Y. Penal Law § 2189-a in effect provides that psychiatric examination is to
be used to determine whether or not the defendant understands the charges against him
and whether or not he can be rehabilitated.
16. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 935:
Whenever within the period of probation any probationer shall violate his probation, the court may issue a warrant for his arrest and may commit him without
bail. On his being arraigned and after an opportunity to be heard the court may
revoke, continue or modify his probation. If revoked, the court may impose any
sentence it might have originally imposed.
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right to have it complied with, he could waive his right and enforce the prior
sentence.
The District Attorney claimed that Section 2189-a was enacted for the
benefit of the public to be sure that sex offenders would be rehabilitated before
release from prison or probation and therefore the requirements could not be
waived by the defendant. Since the Court found Section 2189-a was substantially complied with it did not have to pass on the question of waiver
and therefore the question remains to be adjudicated in a future case.
CO,-TM NT TO MENTAL HOSPrAL AFTER

CONVICTION

CONSTITUTES JUDGM3ENT

Upon the relator's entry of a plea of guilty, in 1935, to a charge of grand
larceny, he was committed to Napanoch in accordance with Section 438 of
the Correction Law. This section provides that only "A male mental defective
over 16 years of age convicted of a criminal offense . . ." may be sent to this
institution. At the time of this commitment, he was not present in the court.
In 1940, about two years after his release from another mental hospital to
which he had been transfered, the relator was convicted of burglary and sentenced as a second offender. In People ex rel. Vischi v. Martin, the relator
brought a kabeas corpus proceeding alleging that his committment to Napanoch was improper and therefore he should not have been convicted as a
second offender. The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the Appellate
Division's affirmance of the order of the County Court dismissing the writ. 17
In his attempt to vacate his conviction as a second offender, the relator
argued that under Section 438, commitment to Napanoch constitutes a conviction of the crime charged and therefore is a judgment for purposes of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 473 of the Code, however, requires that
the defendant be present in the court when judgment for a felony conviction
is pronounced. In addition, Sections 471,18 472,19 and 48020 of the Code require other procedures which must be followed in the pronouncement of judgment, which were not compiled with at the time of the Napanoch commitment. Therefore, that conviction should be vacated and he should be remanded
for resentencing as a first offender.
Respondent, the warden of Attica State Prison, contended that relator's
commitment to Napanoch was a conviction, but not a judgment, and therefore the above requirements of the Code are not applicable. The two reasons
17. 8 A.D.2d 768, 187 N.Y.S.2d 339 (4th Dep't 1959), rev'd 8 N.Y.2d 63, 201
N.Y.S.2d 753 (1960).
18. Provides that "After a plea or verdict of guilty . . . the court must appoint a
time for pronouncing judgment."
19. Provides that "The time appointed [for pronouncing judgment] must be at
least two days after the verdict . . ."
20. Provides that "When the defendant appears for judgment he must be asked by
the clerk whether he have any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him."

